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There is now substantial evidence that high employment protection leads
to a sclerotic labor market, with low hiring and separation rates, and long
unemployment duration.1 While this may not lead to high unemployment|
because of the opposite e®ects of low °ows and high duration of the unem-
ployment rate|it is likely to lead to both lower productivity and lower
output.
Reducing employment protection runs however into strong political op-
position. The reason is simple: Those who are currently protected see them-
selves as having more to lose than to gain from such a reduction. For this
reason, governments have been reluctant to implement across-the-board de-
creases in employment protection. Instead, they have either done little, or
they have tried to reform at the margin, allowing for reduced protection for
some new contracts, but not for existing ones. In France for example, ¯rms
now can, under some conditions, hire workers for a ¯xed duration, at the
end of which separation occurs with low separation costs. If workers are
kept beyond this ¯xed duration however, later separation becomes subject
¤MIT and NBER, and MIT respectively. Preliminary and incomplete. We thank Larry
Katz for discussions.
1See OECD [1999], and Blanchard and Portugal [1998].
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to the normal ¯ring cost.
Are such partial reforms better than none? The motivation for this paper
was our suspicion that the answer might actually be no, that the e®ects of
such a partial reform might be perverse, leading to higher unemployment,
lower output, and lower welfare for workers. Our intuition was as follows:
Think of ¯rms as hiring workers in entry-level jobs, ¯nding out how good
the matches are, and then deciding whether or not to keep the workers on
higher productivity, regular, jobs. Now think of reform as lowering ¯ring
costs for entry-level jobs while keeping them the same for regular jobs. This
will have two e®ects: It will make ¯rms more willing to hire new workers, and
see how they perform. But, second, it will make ¯rms more reluctant to keep
them on regular jobs: Even if a match turns out to be quite productive, a
¯rm may still prefer to ¯re the worker while the ¯ring cost is low, and take a
chance with a new worker. One may therefore worry that the result of such a
reform may be more low productivity entry-level jobs, fewer regular jobs, and
lower overall productivity and output. Higher turnover in entry level jobs
may lead to higher, not lower, unemployment. And, even if unemployment
comes down, workers may actually be worse o®, going through many spells
of unemployment and low productivity entry-level jobs, before obtaining a
regular job (The French have a word for such a succession of unemployment
spells and low productivity jobs: They call this \precarite". There does not
seem to be an equivalent english term.)
Our purpose in this paper is to explore this argument, both theoretically
and empirically. Our interest is broader than just the e®ects of ¯xed duration
contracts in France. We see our paper as shedding light on two larger issues.
First, the e®ect of labor market institutions on the nature of the labor
market, a popular but often fuzzy theme. Second, the pitfalls of partial
labor market reforms.
Our paper is organized as follows: We develop a formal model in Section
1, solve it analytically in Section 2, and further explore its properties by use
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of simulations in Section 3. The model makes clear that partial reform may
indeed be perverse, increasing unemployment as well as decreasing welfare.
We then turn to the empirical evidence, looking at the e®ects of the intro-
duction of ¯xed duration contracts in France since the early 1980s. Section
4 shows the basic evolutions. Section 5 looks more closely at the evolution of
wages by contract type, and at transitions between entry-level jobs, regular
jobs, and unemployment. The reforms appear to have increased turnover,
without substantially reducing unemployment duration. Their e®ect on wel-
fare appears ambiguous at best. Section 6 concludes.2
1 A simple model
We think of the labor market as a market in which match-idiosyncratic
productivity shocks lead to separations and new hires. In that context,
we think of employment protection as layo® costs, a®ecting both the layo®
decision and the nature of bargaining between workers and ¯rms.
In this section, we describe the model, derive the Bellman equations, and
characterize the equilibrium conditions.
1.1 Assumptions
The economy has a labor force of mass 1. There is a constant °ow of en-
trants equal to s, and each individual retires with instantaneous probability
(Poisson parameter) s, so the °ow of retirements is equal to the °ow of
entrants.
2Throughout, our focus is on the economic e®ects of the introduction of ¯xed duration
contracts, not on their political economy implications. These political economy issues
have been studied by Gilles Saint-Paul in a series of contributions, in particular Saint-
Paul [1996] and Saint-Paul [2000].
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Firms are risk neutral value maximizers. They can create a position at
cost k, and then operate it forever. They can always ¯ll the position in-
stantaneously, by hiring a worker from the pool of unemployed. In other
words, the matching technology has \workers waiting at the gate" (Intro-
ducing matching frictions on both sides of the market is inessential here.)
The number of positions in the economy is determined by free entry, and
thus by the condition that there is zero net pro¯t. The interest rate is equal
to r.
New matches all start with productivity equal to y0. Productivity then
changes with instantaneous probability ¸. The new level of productivity y
is drawn from a distribution with cumulative distribution function F (y) and
expected value Ey. y is then constant until the worker retires.
Nothing in the algebra depends on it, but it is useful to think of y0 as
smaller than Ey. This captures the idea that workers start on low produc-
tivity, \entry-level" jobs, and, if they are not laid o®, move on to higher
productivity, \regular" jobs. The assumption that, after the ¯rst draw, pro-
ductivity is constant until the worker retires, is also inessential but captures
in the simplest way the notion that regular jobs are likely to last much longer
than entry-level jobs.
When productivity changes from y0 to y, the ¯rm can decide either to lay
o® the worker|and hire a new worker in an entry-level job with productivity
y0|or keep him on a regular job, with productivity y (until the worker
retires, at which point the ¯rm hires a new worker with productivity y0.)
At the center of our model and crucial to the ¯rm's decisions are state
imposed ¯ring costs. We take them to be pure waste (think administrative
and legal costs) rather than transfers. The ¯ring cost associated with an
entry job (i.e. up to and including the time at which the productivity level
changes from y0 to y) is c0. The ¯ring cost associated with a regular job (i.e.
starting just after the change in productivity from y0 to y) is c. Separations
due to retirement are not subject to ¯ring costs.
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We can look at the same labor market from the point of view of the work-
ers. Workers are risk neutral, with discount rate equal to r, and they retire
with instantaneous probability s. By normalization, the °ow utility of being
unemployed is equal to 0. New workers enter the labor market unemployed.
They look for an entry-level job, which they ¯nd with probability x, where
x = h=u, with h being the °ow of hires, and u being the unemployment
rate. Their entry-level job comes to an end with instantaneous probability
¸, at which time they are either laid o®, or retained on a regular job. If they
are laid o®, they become unemployed, and look for another entry job. The
model therefore generates a work life-cycle, in which young workers typically
go through a succession of unemployment spells and entry-level jobs until
they obtain a regular job, which they keep until they retire.
The °ow into unemployment is composed of new entrants and of those
workers who are laid o® at the end of their entry-level job. The °ow out of
unemployment is equal to the number of workers hired on new entry-level
jobs. All regular jobs are ¯lled from within, and all regular jobs end with
retirement.
The only element of the model left to specify is wage determination.
We assume that wages, both in entry-level and in regular jobs, are set by
symmetric Nash bargaining, with continuous renegotiation. All entry-level
jobs have the same level of productivity y0 and thus pay the same wage w0.
Regular jobs have di®erent levels of productivity; the wage in a regular job
with productivity y is denoted w(y).
Given the way we have set up the model, distortions in this economy
come only from the presence of the two ¯ring costs, c and c0. Our focus in
this paper will be on the e®ects of a decrease in c0 given c, i.e. of a decrease
in the ¯ring costs associated with entry-level jobs, keeping unchanged the
¯ring costs associated with regular jobs.
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1.2 Bellman equations
Consider ¯rst the Bellman equations characterizing the ¯rm. Let V0 be the
value to the ¯rm of having a position ¯lled as an entry-level job, a job with
current productivity equal to y0. Let V (y) be the value of a regular job with
productivity equal to y. Let y¤ be the threshold level of productivity above
which the ¯rm keeps a worker, and below which it lays him o®.
V0 is given by:
rV0 = (y0 ¡w0)¡ c0¸F (y¤) + ¸
Z 1
y¤
(V (y)¡ V0)dF (y)
The ¯rst term on the right gives °ow pro¯t. The second gives the ¯ring
cost associated with terminating the entry-level job, times the probability
that the worker is laid o®|itself equal to the probability of a productivity
change, times the probability that y is less than the threshold value y¤. The
third term re°ects the expected change in the value of the job if the worker is
kept on a regular job. (Note the absence of a term re°ecting the probability
that the worker retires. If the worker retires while in an entry-level job, the
¯rm can replace him instantaneously at no cost by a worker with the same
productivity, so this term is equal to s(V0 ¡ V0) = 0.) The sum of these
three terms must be equal to the annuity value of V0, the left side.
V (y) is given in turn by:
rV (y) = (y ¡w(y)) + s(V0 ¡ V (y))
The ¯rst term on the right gives °ow pro¯t if productivity is equal to y.
The second term re°ects the change in value if the worker retires and the
¯rm must hire a new worker at productivity level y0. The sum of the two
must be equal to the annuity value of a regular job, rV (y).
Turn to the Bellman equations for a worker. Let V e0 denote the utility
of a worker in an entry-level job, V u the utility of an unemployed worker,
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and V e(w(y)) the utility of a worker in a regular job with productivity y.
Note that V u is also the expected utility of an entrant in the labor market,
or, equivalently, the average utility of an individual in the economy; for this
reason, we shall use it as our measure of welfare in this model.
V e0 is given by:
rV e0 = w0 + ¸F (y
¤)(V u ¡ V e0 )¡ sV e0 + ¸
Z 1
y¤
(V e(w(y))¡ V e0 )dF (y)
The ¯rst term on the right is the wage on an entry-level job. The second
is the probability that the job ends, times the change in utility from going
from employment to unemployment. The third re°ects the loss in utility
from retirement. The fourth re°ects the expected change in utility if the
worker is retained on a regular job. The sum of these terms is equal to the
annuity value of the utility of being on an entry-level job.
V e(w(y)) is given by:
rV e(w(y)) = w(y)¡ sV e(w(y))
The worker receives the wage associated with productivity level y, until
he retires.
Finally, V u is given by:
rV u = x(V e0 ¡ V u)¡ sV u
The ¯rst term is equal to the probability of being hired in an entry-level
job, the second the probability of retiring while unemployed, times the loss
in utility from retirement.
Perverse e®ects of partial reform 8
1.3 Equilibrium conditions
The model imposes four equilibrium conditions. The ¯rst is the free entry
condition, that the value of a new position be equal to the cost of creating
it:
V0 = k
The second is that, at the threshold level of productivity, the ¯rm be
indi®erent between keeping the worker, or laying him o®, paying the ¯ring
cost, and hiring a new worker:
V (y¤) = V0 ¡ c0
The third is the Nash bargaining condition for entry-level jobs. A worker
who loses an entry-level job loses V e0 ¡ V u. A ¯rm which lays o® a worker
on an entry-level job loses V0 ¡ V0 + c0 = c0. This implies:
V e0 ¡ V u = c0
The fourth is the Nash bargaining condition for regular jobs. A worker
who loses a regular job loses V e(w(y))¡V u. A ¯rm which lays o® a worker
on a regular job loses V (y)¡V0+ c. The Nash condition therefore takes the
form:
V e(w(y))¡ V u = V (y)¡ V0 + c
We now turn to a characterization of the equilibrium.
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2 The equilibrium
The nature of the equilibrium depends on two distortions|both coming
from the presence of c and c0. The ¯rst is a distortion in the choice of
whether to keep a worker in a regular job, i.e. in the choice of the threshold
y¤. The second is a distortion in the choice of whether to hire a worker in
an entry-level job.
We examine both decisions in turn. In each case, we derive a relation be-
tween the threshold y¤ and the value of being unemployed, V u, and show the
e®ect of the two distortions on each.3 We then characterize the equilibrium
values of y¤ and V u, and the e®ects of changes in c0.
2.1 The decision to keep a worker on a regular job
Suppose that the choice of the threshold productivity level were privately
e±cient, i.e. maximized the total expected surplus from the match, given
¯ring costs and labor market conditions. This privately e±cient threshold,
call it y^¤, would satisfy:
(V (y^¤)¡ V0 + c0) + (V e(w(y^¤))¡ V u) = 0 (2:1)
The total surplus from a match with productivity equal to the threshold
would be equal to zero.
Now turn to the derivation of the actual threshold chosen by ¯rms. The
threshold condition is V (y¤)¡V0+c0 = 0. The Nash bargaining condition for
regular jobs can be rewritten as V e(w(y¤))¡V u = V (y¤)¡V0+c0+(c¡c0):
What matters for the division of the surplus on regular jobs is not c0, the
¯ring cost applicable at the time of the productivity change, but the ¯ring
3It turns out that the equilibrium is best understood using these two variables. As we
show below, the other variables can all be derived from V u and y¤.
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cost c, which is the relevant ¯ring cost at the time of renegotiation. Combin-
ing these two equations gives an implicit characterization of the threshold
productivity:
(V (y¤)¡ V0 + c0) + (V e(w(y¤))¡ V u) = c¡ c0 (2:2)
Note that this condition di®ers from the privately e±cient condition by
(c¡c0). If c0 is less than c, the threshold, and by implication the layo® rate,
will be too high relative to the privately e±cient level.
Using the Bellman equations to derive V (y¤) + V (w(y¤)), together with
the free entry condition V0 = k, gives our ¯rst relation between y
¤ and V u:
y¤ + sk
r + s
¡ V u ¡ k + c0 = c¡ c0 (2:3)
The derivatives are as follows:
dy¤
dV u
= (r + s)
The higher the utility of being unemployed V u, the higher must be the
productivity of the marginal match.
dy¤
dc0
= ¡2(r + s)
The lower the ¯ring cost on entry-level jobs, c0, the more attractive it
is to terminate a match, thus the higher the threshold (and also the larger
the deviation of the threshold y¤ from its privately e±cient level y^¤, thus
the larger the overdestruction).
2.2 The decision to hire a worker for an entry-level job
Suppose that the decision to hire a worker on an entry level job were privately
e±cient, i.e. maximized the total expected surplus from a match, given ¯ring
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costs and labor market conditions. It would then be the case that:
(V e0 ¡ V u) = 0 (2:4)
Hiring would take place until the total surplus from a match was driven
to zero. Given that ¯rms can hire workers costlessly and instantaneously,
hiring would take place until the utility of being employed on an entry-level
job was just equal to the utility of being unemployed.
Now turn to the derivation of the actual condition determining hiring.
From the Nash bargaining condition for entry-level jobs, it follows that:
(V e0 ¡ V u) = c0 (2:5)
The di®erence between the value of being employed and the value of being
unemployed is not driven to zero, but rather to c0, the ¯ring cost for entry-
level jobs. This standard distortion re°ects the increased bargaining power
of workers coming from renegotiation in the presence of ¯ring costs.
Rewrite this condition as V e0 + V0 ¡ (V u + V0) = c0, use the Bellman
equations to characterize the behavior of V e0 + V0 together with the free
entry condition V0 = k to get:
y0+¸
Z 1
y¤
y + sk
r + s
dF (y)+sk¡(r+s+¸(1¡F (y¤)))(V u+k) = (r+s+¸(1+F (y¤))c0
(2:6)
This gives our second relation between V u, y¤, and c0. The way to think
about it is that it gives the feasible level of utility of being unemployed V u.
More precisely, it gives the level of utility of being unemployed such that
the wages set in bargaining, and by implication, the present value of pro¯ts
associated with a new position just cover the cost of creating that position.
Now consider the e®ect of y¤ on V u in (2.6):
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(r + s+ ¸(1¡ F (y¤)))dV
u
dy¤
= ¸f(y¤)(V u + k ¡ c0 ¡ y
¤ + sk
r + s
)
The sign of the derivative is in general ambiguous. An increase in y¤ leads
both to a higher expected output in continuing jobs, but also to a higher
probability that jobs are terminated. Note however that, at the equilibrium
(i.e. at the intersection with the ¯rst relation, (2.3)), the derivative is given
by:
(r + s+ ¸(1¡ F (y¤)))dV
u
dy¤
= ¡¸f(y¤)(c¡ c0) · 0
If both (c ¡ c0) and the density function f(y¤) are di®erent from zero,
then an increase in y¤ leads to a decrease in V u. If either c = c0 or f(y¤) = 0,
then V u is independent of y¤. The intuition is as follows: As we saw earlier,
if c = c0, the threshold decision is privately e±cient, so a small change in y
¤
has no e®ect on the surplus and thus no e®ect on the feasible Vu. If c > c0
however, the marginal job generates a positive surplus, so an increase in
y¤, if it leads to an increase in the layo® rate (i.e. if f(y¤) > 0) leads to a
smaller total surplus, requiring a decrease in the feasible Vu.
Now consider the e®ect of c0 on Vu. From (2.6):
(r + s+ ¸(1¡ F (y¤)))dV
u
dc0
= ¡(r + s+ ¸)¡ ¸F (y¤) < 0
An increase in c0 decreases the feasible level of utility, V u. There are two
separate e®ects at work here. The ¯rst, captured by¡¸F (y¤), is a direct cost
e®ect: An increase in c0 increases ¯ring costs, and therefore increases waste,
leading to a decrease in the feasible value of V u. The second, captured by
(r+ s+ ¸), re°ects the e®ects of ¯ring costs through bargaining. As shown
in (2.5), an increase in c0 requires new matches to generate a larger surplus.
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In equilibrium, this is achieved through a lower value of V u.4
2.3 The equilibrium
The two relations we have just derived are drawn in Figure 1. The ¯rst re-
lation, (2.3), refered to as the \threshold condition" in the ¯gure, is upward
sloping: The higher V u, the higher the threshold y¤. The second relation,
refered to as the \feasible utility" condition in the ¯gure, is either °at or
downward sloping (it is drawn as downward sloping here), at least around
the equilibrium. Together the two relations determine the threshold pro-
ductivity level and the level of utility of new entrants. The equilibrium is
given by point A.
The e®ects of a partial reform of employment protection, i.e. the e®ects
of a decrease in c0 on y
¤ and on V u, keeping c constant, are then easy to
derive. The \threshold condition" shifts to the right: For given V u, the lower
value of c0 makes it more attractive to layo® entry-level workers, and thus
increases y¤. The \feasible utility" condition shifts up: For given y¤, lower
c0 leads to a higher level of feasible utility, both because of the reduction
in costs, and because of the decrease in the bargaining power of entry-level
workers.
The new equilibrium is given by point B. It is clear that, while y¤
unambiguously increases, the e®ect on V u is ambiguous. This is because
there are two distortions at work, and they work in opposite directions. On
the one hand, the decrease in c0 leads to an increase in (c ¡ c0) and thus
4This is a familiar result from bargaining or e±ciency wage models, (for example
Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984], or more recently Caballero and Hammour [1996]), that, in
equilibrium, unemployment plays the role of a market \discipline device". In these mod-
els, the zero pro¯t condition ties down the wage. Any factor which increases the wage
given reservation utility requires, in equilibrium, a decrease in reservation utility.
Perverse e®ects of partial reform 14
to an increase in the distortion a®ecting the layo® decision. This tends to
decrease V u. On the other hand, the decrease in c0 leads to a decrease in
the distortion a®ecting the hiring decision. This tends to increase V u.
To see the two e®ects more clearly, suppose ¯rst that (c¡ c0) is equal to
zero. In this case the ¯rst distortion is absent and, as we saw, small changes
in y¤ have no e®ect on V u in the \feasible utility" relation. Thus, the only
e®ect of a decrease in c0 on V
u is through its direct e®ect in the \feasible
utility" relation: By both decreasing waste and decreasing the bargaining
power of entry-level workers, the decrease in c0 leads to an unambiguous
increase in V u.
This case is represented in Figure 2. We know from above that, if (c¡
c0) = 0, the \feasible utility" locus is °at at the equilibrium. The decrease in
c0 shifts the \feasible utility" condition up: Lower costs and lower bargaining
power by entry-level workers lead to a higher equilibrium value of V u. The
decrease in c0 shifts the \threshold condition" locus to the right: For given
V u, a decrease in c0 makes layo®s more attractive, leading to an increase in
y¤. The equilibrium moves from A to B, with higher utility level V u, and a
higher threshold, y¤.
When (c ¡ c0) is positive instead, the e®ect of the decrease in c0 on
the ¯rst distortion becomes relevant. The decrease in (c ¡ c0) leads to an
increase in the ¯rst distortion, and thus, other things equal, to a decrease
in V u. The strength of this e®ect is proportional to (c ¡ c0)f(y¤) and is
thus increasing in the density evaluated at the equilibrium{in the number
of entry level jobs which are (ine±ciently) terminated as a result of the
increase in y¤. For either (c ¡ c0) or f(y¤) su±ciently large, this adverse
e®ect can dominate. Figure 3 is drawn on the assumption that f(y) is very
large around y = y¤, so the \feasible utility" locus is (nearly) vertical. In
this case, a decrease in c0 does not shift the \feasible utility" locus. But,
as before, it shifts the \threshold condition" locus to the right: For given
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V u, a decrease in c0 makes layo®s more attractive, leading to an increase in
y¤. The equilibrium moves from A to B, with lower utility level V u0 , and an
unchanged threshold, y¤.
To summarize, we have a ¯rst answer to our initial question. If (c¡ c0)
or/and f(y¤) are su±ciently large, a partial reform may indeed lead to an
increase in excess turnover, and, by implication, to a decrease in utility.
2.4 Other wage setting assumptions
We have assumed symmetric Nash bargaining. It is easy to extend the
analysis to allow for di®erential bargaining power, both between ¯rms and
workers, and between workers on entry-level and on regular jobs. The results
of this extension are straightforward. The higher the bargaining power of
workers on regular jobs relative to that of workers on entry-level jobs, the
stronger the e®ect of a decrease in c0 on the ¯rst distortion, the more likely it
is that partial reform leads to a decrease rather than an increase in welfare.
We have also examined the e®ects of a minimum wage constraint. As we
shall discuss and explain below when presenting simulations, under the Nash
bargaining assumptions, decreases in V u are associated with an increase in
w0. Thus, a constraint which prevents the wage from decreasing, such as a
minimum wage constraint, will not be binding, and will not rule out perverse
e®ects of partial reform on welfare (A constraint which prevents the wage
from increasing will increase welfare; but this does not seem to be the right
representation of a minimum wage constraint.)
2.5 Other glimpses
Given the equilibrium values of y¤ and V u, it is straightforward to derive
the other variables of the model. For example:
² The layo® rate is given by ¸F (y¤), so a decrease in c0, which, as we
have seen, unambiguously increases y¤, unambiguously increases the
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layo® rate.
² Using the condition that V e0 ¡ V u = c0, the hiring rate from unem-
ployment x is given by x = (r + s)V u=c0. Thus, if reform is welfare
improving|if V u increases when c0 decreases|we know that x in-
creases, equivalently, unemployment duration decreases. But the e®ect
is ambiguous in general.
² The unemployment rate is given by u(x + s ¡ (¸F (y¤)x)=(¸ + s)) =
s. Even if unemployment duration decreases (x increases), higher
turnover (F (y¤) increases) implies an ambiguous e®ect on the unem-
ployment rate.
² From the Nash bargaining conditions, the values of being employed
in an entry-level job, and of being employed in a regular job with
productivity equal to the threshold are related by V e0 ¡ V u = c0 and
V e(w(y¤))¡V e0 = c¡2c0. Thus, a decrease in c0 makes entry jobs more
like unemployment (decreasing c0), and entry jobs less like regular jobs
(increasing c¡ 2c0). In this sense, a reduction in c0 leads to increased
dualism in the labor market.
To fully characterize the e®ects of the decrease in c0 on the di®erent
dimensions of our economy, it is more convenient to turn to simulations.
This is what we do in the next section.
3 Simulations
Our goal in this section is to show the e®ects of partial reform both on the
work life-cycle of an individual worker, as well as on macro aggregates, from
unemployment to GDP.
We think of the unit time period as one month, and choose the various
parameters as follows:
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² We normalize the level of output on an entry job, y0 to be equal to 1.
² We take the capital stock, k to be equal to 24, implying a ratio of
capital to annual output of 2.
² We take the monthly real interest rate, r, to be equal to 1%. Together
with the two previous assumptions, this implies a share of labor in
output on entry-level jobs, of (1-.01*24) = 76%.
² We take the monthly probability of exogenous separation (\retire-
ment") s, to be equal to 1.5%.
² We take the monthly probability of a probability change on an entry-
level job, ¸ to be equal to 10%. This implies an expected duration of
an entry-level job of about a year.
² We take the distribution of productivity on regular jobs to be uniform,
distributed on [m¡ 1=2f;m+ 1=2f ], thus with mean m, and density
f . The use of a uniform distribution makes particularly transparent
the in°uence of the density f on the e®ects of partial reform.
² To capture the notion that regular jobs are more productive, we take
the mean m equal to 1.4. (Because jobs below the threshold are ter-
minated, the mean of the observed distribution will be higher.)
² Because our theoretical analysis in the previous section showed that
the density function plays a crucial role in determining the outcome,
we look at the e®ects of reform for di®erent values of f . The graphs
below show the results of reform for values of f varying from 1 to 6.
² We choose the ¯ring cost on regular jobs, c, equal to 24|which, in
most simulations, represent about a year and a half of average output.
We shall discuss the legal and empirical evidence for France in the
next section; we believe this to be a reasonable estimate.
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² Our simulations then focus on the e®ects of a decrease in c0. For
c0 either too large or too small, the equilibrium may be at a corner,
i.e. at a point where y¤ lies outside the support of the productivity
distribution for regular jobs. In those cases, changes in c0 have no e®ect
on the layo® rate; their e®ect takes place only through bargaining.
While these corner equilibria are interesting, we limit the presentation
of results to the range where there is an interior solution, so changes
in y¤ a®ect the layo® rate. The results below are presented for the
range where c0 decreases from 6 to 2 months of output.
The results are presented in Figures 4a, 4b, and 5.
Figures 4a and 4b show the e®ects of partial reform on di®erent aspects
of a worker's individual experience. Figure 4a plots V u, the utility of an
entrant, F (y¤), the probability that the worker is laid-o® at the end of an
entry-level job, x the monthly hiring rate from unemployment, and Tu, the
expected time to a regular job starting from unemployment. Figure 4b gives
the behavior of wages in entry-level and regular jobs. These wages are given
by w(y) = a+0:5y and w0 = a0+0:5y0 respectively. Figure 4b plots the two
constant terms a and a0|which give the levels of wages for a given level of
productivity.
For each 3D box, ¯ring costs are plotted on the y axis, decreasing as one
goes away from the origin. The density function f is plotted on the x axis,
with the density decreasing as one goes away from the origin. The variable
of interest is plotted on the vertical axis.
Start with V u in Figure 4a. For low density, low f , a decrease in c0
increases utility. But, for high density f , it decreases utility. The basic
intuition was given in the previous section. When f is low, the adverse
e®ects of reform on excess turnover are small, and workers are better o®.
When f is high, the adverse e®ects of excess turnover dominate.
This intuition is con¯rmed by looking at x and F (y¤). While the e®ect
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of reform on x is theoretically ambiguous, in our simulation reform always
increases x, and thus decreases unemployment duration. It also always (this
is theoretically unambiguous) increases the probability that an entry-level
job will lead to a layo®. This second e®ect is stronger when density is high.
For f = 6, the probability increases from 0.3 to 0.8; for f = 1, the probability
increases from 0.45 to 0.75.
The last box in Figure 4a shows that reform increases the average time
it takes a new entrant to get a regular job. The e®ect is stronger when the
density is high. For f = 6, the expected time increases from two years to
nearly six years.
Figure 4b gives the behavior of wages on regular and entry-level jobs for
a given level of productivity. The relative level of the two wages ¯ts one's
prior: Higher ¯ring costs lead to higher bargaining power and thus a higher
wage on regular jobs. But the e®ect of a decrease in c0 is less intuitive at
¯rst. One might have guessed that the decrease in the relative bargaining
power of entry-level workers would lead to a decrease in their wage relative
to that of workers on regular jobs. This is not necessarily the case: In general
equilibrium, the duration of unemployment changes, with di®erential e®ects
on the two wages. Figure 4b shows that the e®ect of reforms on the wage
in regular jobs has the same sign as the e®ect on utility: Like utility, the
wage may go up or down; this re°ects the tight link between reservation
utility and the wage set in Nash bargaining on regular jobs. Perhaps even
more surprisingly, in our simulations, the wage on entry level jobs goes up,
the more so the higher the density. The way to understand this is in terms
of bonding. The higher the density, the more a decrease in c0 decreases
the probability of being kept on a regular job. Thus, the lower the bond
workers on entry-level jobs are willing to pay in the form of low wages, or
equivalently, the higher the wage they require to take an entry-level job.5
5From an interview of a worker on a CDD: \The only reason I took a CDD was to have
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There is another countervailing e®ect at work, lower bargaining power for
workers in entry-level jobs, which leads to a decrease in the wage; but in our
simulation, this e®ect is dominated by the ¯rst.
Figure 5 shows what happens to the macroeconomic aggregates. The
¯rst box repeats the graph for V u in Figure 4. We can think here of V u not
as the expected value of utility if unemployed, but as average lifetime utility
for a worker in the economy.
The second box shows the e®ects of reform on the unemployment rate,
and shows these e®ects to be ambiguous. For low density, the combined
e®ects of lower duration and only slightly higher turnover lead to a decrease
in unemployment. For high density, the e®ect is ambiguous. Unemployment
¯rst goes up as c0 decreases, then goes down a bit. (This is a warning, if
there was a need, that what happens to utility and to unemployment, need
not have the same sign. For high density, utility goes down strongly while
unemployment goes up and then down.)
The third box plots the proportion of workers who are either unemployed
or employed in entry-level jobs. The idea is to get at the idea of \precarite",
the idea that the decrease in unemployment, if any, may come with a large
increase in low productivity level jobs. This proportion increases with re-
form, for all values of f . Again, it is stronger when f is high. In this sense,
reform indeed increases precarite.
The last graph gives the value of GDP. For low density, the decrease
in the unemployment rate, together with the limited increase in low pro-
ductivity entry-level jobs, leads to an increase in output. For high density,
the larger increase in the proportion of entry-level jobs, and the roughly
constant unemployment rate, combine to lead to a decline in output|by
nearly 5% under our parameter assumptions. Another warning is therefore
a shot at a real job later on."Liberation [2000].
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in order here: What happens to output, to unemployment, and to utility,
can all be quite di®erent.
4 The introduction of CDDs in France: Basic facts and evo-
lutions
Regular contracts in France, called \Contrats a duree indetermin¶ee", or
\CDI" for short, are subject to employment protection. Firms can layo®
workers for one of two reasons: For \personal reasons", in which case they
have to show that the worker cannot do the job he was hired for, or for
\economic reasons", in which case, the ¯rm must prove that it needs to
reduce its employment.6
Barring serious negligence on the part of the worker, the ¯rm must give
both a notice period and a severance payment to the worker. The notice
period is relatively short, 1 or 2 months depending on seniority. The amount
of severance pay is also relatively modest, typically 1/10 of a year per year
of work, plus 1/15 for years above 10 years. But ¯rms perceive costs to
be much higher, because of the administrative and legal steps required to
go through the process. The monetary equivalent of these costs (which are
indeed waste from the point of view of ¯rms and workers) is hard to assess,
but severance packages o®ered by ¯rms in exchange for a quick resolution
are typically much more generous than the legal minimum.7
Since the late 1970s, successive governments have tried to reduce these
costs by introducing ¯xed duration contracts, called \Contrats µa dur¶ee de-
termin¶ee", or CDDs. These contracts still require a severance payment, but
eliminate the need for a costly administrative and legal process.8
6A useful source on French labor legislation is the Lamy [2000].
7For a comparison of France with other OECD countries, see OECD [1999].
8Poulain [1994] gives a detailed description of the rules governing CDDs.
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4.1 The history and the current rules
A brief history of CDDs goes as follows: CDDs were introduced in 1979.
With the election of a socialist government in 1981, and the passage of a
law in 1982, their scope was drastically reduced: A list of 12 conditions
was drawn, and only under those conditions could ¯rms use ¯xed duration
contracts. In 1986, the 12 conditions were replaced by a general rule: CDDs
should not be used to ¯ll a permanent position in the ¯rm. The current
architecture dates to an agreement signed in March 1990.
Under this agreement, CDDs can be o®ered by ¯rms for only one of
four reasons: (1) The replacement of an employee on leave (2) Temporary
increases in activity (3) Seasonal activities (4) Special contracts, aimed at
facilitating employment for targeted groups, from the young to the long term
unemployed. The list of special contracts has grown in the 1990s, as each
government has tried to improve labor market outcomes for one group or
another; some of these contracts require the ¯rm to provide training, and
most come with subsidies to ¯rms.
CDDs are subject to a very short trial period, typically 1 month. They
have a ¯xed duration, from 6 to 24 months depending on the speci¯c contract
type. Mean duration is roughly one year. They typically cannot be renewed,
and, in any case, cannot be renewed beyond 24 months. If the worker is
kept, he or she must then be hired on a regular contract. If the worker is
not kept, he or she receives a severance payment equal to 6% of the total
salary received during the life of the contract.
Two other dimensions of these contracts are relevant here:
First, the law states that the wage paid to a worker under a CDD should
be the same as the wage which would be paid to a worker doing the same
job under a CDI. This is obviously di±cult to verify and enforce, and, as we
shall see, it appears not to be satis¯ed in practice.
Second, at the end of a CDD, workers qualify for unemployment bene-
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¯ts. Unemployment bene¯ts start at either 40% of the previous gross salary,
plus a ¯xed sum, or 57.4% of previous gross salary, whichever is more ad-
vantageous. The bene¯ts then decrease over time; the decrease is faster the
younger the worker, and the shorter the work experience. For example, a
worker who has been working for 4 out of the previous 8 months, gets ben-
e¯ts for 4 months; a worker who has been working for 6 out of the previous
12 months gets 4 months with full bene¯ts, then 3 months at 85%, then
nothing, and so on for workers with longer employment histories. In short,
workers can alternate between CDDs and unemployment spells, and receive
bene¯ts while unemployed.
For our purposes, the history and the speci¯c set of rules regulating
CDDs has two main implications:
² One should think of what has happened since the 1980s primarily as an
increase in ¯xed duration contracts at the extensive margin (a number
of workers and jobs for which temporary contracts can be used), rather
than as an increase in the intensive margin (a decrease in c0).
² The rather stringent rules governing CDDs (conditions, duration, non
renewal) imply that, while the proportion of workers under CDDs has
increased over time, it has not reached|and, unless rules are changed,
will not reach|the levels observed in some other European countries,
in particular Spain.9
4.2 The aggregate evidence
We now give a brief description of aggregate evolutions. Our data, here
and in the next section, come from \Enquetes emploi", a survey of about
9For a description of the nature and the scope of ¯xed duration contracts in Spain, and
in Italy, see for example Guell-Rotllan and Petrongolo [2000], and Adam and Canziani
[1998].
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1/300th of the French population, conducted annually by INSEE, the French
National Statistical Institute.
Questions about CDI versus CDD status are only available from 1983
on, so we only look at the evidence from 1983 to 1998. The design of the
survey, and the wording of some of the questions were changed in 1990,
leading to discontinuities in some of the series in 1990; these discontinuities
appear clearly in some of the ¯gures below.
As background, Figure 6 plots the aggregate unemployment rate from
1970 to 2000, highlighting the period we shall focus on, 1983 to 1998. While
the unemployment rate has increased a lot since 1970, most of the increase
predates the period we shall concentrate on. In 1983, the unemployment
rate was 8.3%. After a further increase, then a decline in the late 1980s,
it increased again in the ¯rst half of the 1990s, reaching 12.3% in 1996. In
1998, it stood at 11.8%. Since then, it has declined further, and now stands
just under 10%.
Figure 7 plots the evolution of CDD employment, as a proportion of
total (salaried) employment. The ¯gure shows a steady increase in this
proportion, from 1.4% of salaried employment in 1983 to 9.6% in 1998. At
the same time, the ¯gure makes clear that the speci¯c conditions under
which ¯rms can o®er CDDs have limited their scope; by contrast, in Spain
today, more than 30% of salaried employment is in the form of ¯xed duration
contracts.
While the proportion of CDDs in total employment remains limited, the
introduction and development of CDDs have completely changed the nature
of the labor market for the young. Figure 8 shows the evolution of the
proportions of individuals, age 20-25, who are either employed under a CDI,
employed under a CDD, or unemployed, or students, from 1983 to 1998.
The ¯gure yields a number of conclusions:
² The proportion of students in this age group has increased dramati-
Perverse e®ects of partial reform 25
cally, from 21.4% in 1983 to 51.7% in 1998. This increase is due in
large part to a deliberate policy aimed at increasing the proportion
of children taking and passing the baccalaureat (the exam at the end
of high school); this proportion has increased over the same period
from 28% to 59%. But it is also a re°ection of the poor labor mar-
ket prospects for the young, and indicates that, for this age group,
unemployment numbers should be interpreted with caution.
² The proportion of unemployed in a given 5-year cohort has remained
roughly constant, from 15.4% in 1983 to 14.8% in 1998 (although, be-
cause of decreased participation, the unemployment rate has increased
from 19.6% to 30.8%).
² Most relevant for our purposes, the proportion of CDIs has sharply
dropped while the proportion of CDDs sharply increased. In 1983,
60.3% of a cohort (equivalently 95.1% of those employed) were em-
ployed under CDIs; in 1998, the proportion was down to 18.7% (56%
of those employed). And during the same period, the proportion of
those employed under CDDs went from 3.0% (4.8% of employment) in
1983, to 14.7% (44% of employment).
The same qualitative evolution is visible in other age groups, but its
quantitative e®ect decreases across cohorts. The proportion of CDDs
has increased from 1.6% in 1983 to 10% in 1998 for a 25-30 cohort,
from 1.1% in 1983 to 5.6% in 1997 for a 30-35 cohort, and so on.
We have looked at di®erences by age group; one can take other cuts, such
as education. One might have expected the proportion of CDDs to decrease
with the level of education. This is not the case. In 1998, the proportion
of CDDs was roughly the same across eduction levels. Again, this probably
re°ects the tight conditions under which CDDs can be used by ¯rms.
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5 Transitions, wages, and utility
Our earlier analysis suggested that the introduction of ¯xed duration con-
tracts should have decreased unemployment duration, increased turnover,
leading to ambiguous e®ects on unemployment and on welfare. We now
look at the data. We ¯rst look at the evolution of transition probabilities,
then at the evolution of wages, and end by constructing an empirical proxy
for V u.
Our examination of the data can only be suggestive, as the development
of CDDs is only one of many changes which have taken place in the French
labor market. The aggregate unemployment rate has moved during that
period, in large part for reasons other than the development of CDDs. Other
labor market institutions have been modi¯ed, from the introduction of a
minimum income °oor (the RMI), to the reduction in social contributions
on low wage workers, to a number other programs aimed at speci¯c groups
in the labor market.10 We believe however that, for the group we focus on
below, namely the 20-25 age group, the increase in the proportion of CDDs
is indeed the dominant development, and the exercise is a useful one. Its
limits should however be clear.
5.1 Transition probabilities
Transition probabilities between employment, unemployment, and non par-
ticipation can be constructed in two ways: From 1983 on, the 3-year panel
data structure of the survey allows to follow two thirds of individuals across
consecutive surveys, and so to measure their annual transitions. In addi-
tion, from 1990 on, the survey includes a retrospective question, asking for
employment status 12 months earlier, and thus allows for the construction
10For a description of some of the programs aimed speci¯cally at the youth, look for
example at Fougere et al. [2000].
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of retrospective annual transitions.11
For our purposes, namely assessing the evolutions (rather than the levels)
of transition probabilities over time, it is not clear which approach domi-
nates. As documented by many researchers, transitions based on retro-
spective information are subject to systematic memory biases.12 But these
memory biases are likely to be fairly stable over time. Panel based transi-
tion probabilities su®er instead from some attrition bias. This bias, while
smaller, is more likely to change over time: An increase in the proportion of
workers with short duration jobs may well lead to an increase in attrition.
We therefore remain agnostic and present both the numbers for panel
based transitions from 1984 to 1998, and for retrospective information based
transitions for 1991 to 1998. Because of the di®erences in the structure of
the survey pre- and post-1990, we cannot compute panel based transitions
for 1990 (1989 to 1990). And, for the same reason, some of the panel based
series we present below show step di®erences pre- and post-1990; these re°ect
di®erences in measurement rather than true changes.13
11This question actually asks for status during each of the previous 12 months, thus
allowing for the construction of monthly probabilities|which are closer conceptually to
the instantaneous probabilities in the theoretical model. We have not yet pursued this
route.
12For example, in the Enquetes Emploi, only 70% of those actually unemployed a year
earlier report themselves today as having been unemployed one year earlier. For more on
the di®erences between the two sets of transition probabilities in the context of Enquetes
Emploi, see Philippon [2000].
13Our con¯dence that the shifts re°ect only measurement issues is based on a number
of factors. The main one is that, for a speci¯c question which is worded the same way pre-
and post-1990, the answer (which is used as one of the main elements in the construction
of the employment categories) shows no discontinuity pre- and post-1990.
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Because they are at the center of the story, we focus ¯rst on the evolution
of transition probabilities for the 20-25 age group. The results are reported
in Table 1a and 1b. Transitions for year t refer to the change in status from
March of year t¡ 1 to March of year t. Because of the change in de¯nitions
in 1990, we give numbers separately for 1983 and 1989, and for 1991 and
1998.
² Table 1a shows the transition probabilities from unemployment to
CDD employment, CDI employment, and unemployment respectively
(The transition probabilities sum to less than one, as we do not report
transitions to self employment, internships, military status, student
status, and other non participation.)
The probability of getting a CDD increases strongly in both subperi-
ods. The probability of getting a CDI decreases, also in both subpe-
riods. (Recall that the level shifts between 1989 to 1991, which are
often large in Tables 1a and 1b, re°ect di®erences in measurement.)
Both movements are clearly consistent with the theory.
While the e®ect is theoretically ambiguous, we saw that the dura-
tion of unemployment was likely to decrease as the scope of CDDs
increased. The probability of remaining unemployed indeed decreases
in the 1980s. But there is no evidence of a further decrease in the
1990s (which exhibits °uctuations, but not clear trend, over the eight
years). In other words, during the 1990s, the higher likelihood of get-
ting a CDD rather than a CDI has not come with an overall increase
in the probability of getting a job.
² Table 1b shows the transition probabilities from CDD status.
The probability of remaining on a CDD (the same one, or another
CDD) increases throughout the period, nearly doubling in each of the
two subperiods. The probability of moving to a CDI decreases in each
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of the two subperiods as well. Note that while this is a case where panel
based and retrospective transition probabilities have rather di®erent
levels, their evolution is similar over time.
The probability of being unemployed decreases steadily in the 1980s:
The higher probability of having a CDD rather than a CDI is compen-
sated by an increase in the overall probability of having a job. But,
again, there appears to be a di®erence across the two decades. In the
1990s, the transition probability, be it panel based or retrospective,
exhibits substantial °uctuations but no further downward trend.
Table 1 hides (unintentionally) interesting year-to-year evolutions. One
of particular interest (in the sense that it shows the strong e®ects of speci¯c
policies on transition probabilities) is the evolution of transition probabilities
from unemployment in 1995. For example, the panel based probability of
remaining unemployed goes from 0.45 in 1994 to 0.71 in 1995, back to 0.47
in 1996. The reason is a set of policy measures taken in 1995 (thus a®ecting
1994 to 1995 transitions) aimed at reinserting the long term unemployed
adults. The subsidies given to ¯rms lead to a large increase in transitions
into CDDs for the target group, but an equally large decrease in transitions
into CDDs for the other groups, especially the young.
One can construct similar tables for the other age groups. The qualita-
tive features are the same, but the evolutions are more muted the older the
age group. We do not report them here.
To summarize: The transition probabilities give a picture of a market
where the probability of getting a CDD has steadily increased, the probabil-
ity of getting a CDI has decreased, and the probability of staying or becom-
ing unemployed shows no clear trend. In that last dimension, there appears
to be a di®erence across the two decades. The probabilities of becoming
unemployed when on a CDD, or remaining unemployed, both decrease in
the 1980s, but show no further trend in the 1990s.
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5.2 Expected times to a CDI
One way of summarizing the information from the transition matrices is
to compute expected times to a CDI starting from di®erent labor market
positions.
To compute these expected times, we use, for each year, the estimated
transition matrix obtained using either panel data or retrospective informa-
tion, based on eight di®erent states (CDI, CDD, unemployed, self employed,
student, intern, army, other non participation), for the 20-25 group. Note
that this computation assumes static expectations in two dimensions. First
it assumes that future transition probabilities for the 20-25 year old group
will be the same as this year's. Second, it ignores the fact that, as those cur-
rently 20 to 25 year old become older, the relevant transition probabilities
will become those relevant for 25 to 30 year olds, and so on. This second
bias leads to an overestimation of the level of expected times to a CDI. But
what we care about here are changes over time, and this simple approach is
likely to capture them.
The evolution of expected times for the 20-25 age group, starting either
from a CDD or from unemployment, is plotted in Figure 9. There appears
to be a clear di®erence between the 1980s and the 1990s:
Starting from a CDD, the expected time to a CDI appears roughly con-
stant in the 1980s. Starting from unemployment, the expected time de-
creases slightly. This is the result of two o®setting changes: On the one
hand, a decreased probability of getting a CDI starting either from unem-
ployment or from a CDD, leading to an increase in the expected time. On
the other, an increased probability of getting a CDD when unemployed,
a decreased probability of remaining unemployed, together with a higher
probability of getting a CDI from a CDD than from unemployment. In the
1980s, the two e®ects roughly cancel each other.
The picture is di®erent in the 1990s, where expected times increase sig-
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ni¯cantly. While the expected time based on retrospective information is
higher than the expected time based on panel data, both series go up during
the period. The expected time from unemployment based on retrospective
information goes from about 4.8 years to about 8 years; its panel data coun-
terpart goes from 4.2 years to 5.8 years. The main di®erence between the
two decades can be mechanically traced to the di®erence in the evolutions
in the probabilities of remaining or becoming unemployed. These go down
in the 1980s, but remain constant or increase in the 1990s.
A tentative conclusion is therefore that \precarite" did not increase in
the 1980s, but increased in the 1990s. A complete picture however requires
looking also at wages. This is what we do next.
5.3 Wages
To look at the evidence on wages, we run a standard wage regression, re-
gressing for each year, from 1983 to 1998, the logarithm of the monthly net
wage on a set of controls, education (15 categories), age (10 categories), and
a dummy equal to 1 if the worker is on a CDD, 0 if on a CDI. Thus, we run:
logwi = a+Xi¯ + bD + ²i
Figure 10 plots the time series of estimated b's, from estimation of the
wage equation for each year from 1983 to 1998. Given age and education,
CDDs appear to pay about 20% less than CDIs. The evidence suggests also
that the gap between the two wages has increased over time, from 12% in
1983 to 19% in 1989 to 27% in 1998.
How should we interpret this decrease in the relative wage over time? In
our model, partial reform has two e®ects on the wage of CDDs relative to
CDIs: The ¯rst is a decrease in the bargaining power of CDDs, leading to
a decline in their wage. The second is a decline in bonding, in how low a
wage entry-level workers are willing to accept in order to have a chance at
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a regular job. In our model also, a decrease in the relative wage on entry
level jobs, is necessarily associated with an increase in V u. The intuition for
this is that if the wage goes down, the decline in bonding is small, the e®ect
of reform on actual and excess turnover limited, so the reform increases
welfare.
Thus, if the economy conformed to our model, the ¯nding that the wage
has decreased would be prima facie evidence that partial reform has been
welfare improving. There is however one important di®erence between our
model and reality: In our model, all entry level jobs have the same produc-
tivity. This is not the case in reality, and there is a plausible argument that
what has happened over time is the extension of the use of CDDs to jobs or
to workers with lower productivity. If this is the case, the decrease in the
wage we observe in the data may be due neither to bonding or bargaining,
but to a change in the nature of CDD jobs or CDD workers over time. At
this stage, we have not explored this issue further, but we intend to do so
in the future.
5.4 Constructing V u
In our model, the welfare e®ects of partial reform are captured by what
happens to V u, the expected present value of utility if currently unemployed.
It is tempting to construct an empirical counterpart and see how it has
evolved over time. The results must obviously be interpreted with more than
a grain of salt: There are many assumptions and many steps involved in the
construction of V u, and the changes in constructed V u are surely not all due
to the introduction of CDDs. Nevertheless, we think this provides a rather
transparent way of summarizing what we have seen about the evolutions of
transition probabilities and wages in a single statistic.
To compute V u, or more generally, V i, the expected present value of
utility if currently in state i, we proceed as follows.
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Let V i be the expected present value of utility conditional on being
in state i today. We consider 8 states in our computation (CDI, CDD,
unemployed, self employed, student, intern, army, other non participation).
Let V be the associated vector of utilities associated with the di®erent states.
Let A be the transition matrix associated with these di®erent states. Let w
be the vector of wages or wage equivalents associated with each state. Then,
we construct V as:
V = w +
1
1 + r
AV
Or equivalently,
V = (I ¡ 1
1 + r
A)
¡1
w
We focus on the 20-25 age group. For A, we use for each year the es-
timated transition matrix obtained using either panel data or retrospective
information, for the 20-25 age group. Just as for the construction of ex-
pected times earlier, this computation assumes static expectations in two
dimensions, i.e. an unchanged value of the matrix for a given age group
over time, and an unchanged transition matrix as individuals in the group
get older. Just as for expected times, the justi¯cation is simplicity, and our
belief that, as evolutions are qualitatively similar across age groups, this
should capture the relevant trends.
For w, we normalize the CDI wage to 1. Based on wage regressions, we
use a value of 0:8 for the wage associated with CDDs. (We have not at this
point allowed for time variation in the CDD wage discount. If we did, this
would clearly lead to a decline in V u and V cdd relative to V cdi over time.)
Based on unemployment bene¯t rules, we use a value of 0.6 for the wage
equivalent when unemployed. Because the transition probabilities to other
states are small, the other elements of w play little role in the results; we
assume a value of 1 for self employment income, of 0 for other states. We
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use an annual interest rate of 12%.
The results, using transition probabilities both from panel data and from
retrospective information, are presented in Figure 11. Not surprisingly, V cdi
is larger than V cdd, which is in turn larger than V u. Turning to evolutions,
the di®erence between the 1980s and the 1990s we saw earlier is still visible
in Figure 11.
The 1980s appear to be a period where both V u and V cdd both increase,
both absolutely and relative to V cdi. This re°ects both a stable or slightly
decreasing expected time to a CDI from either unemployment or a CDD,
and the fact that more of that time is spent working in entry level jobs
rather than in unemployment.
The 1990s appear to be a period where both V u and V cdd both decrease
(using either retrospective or panel data based transition probabilities). We
have already seen the underlying reason. The expected time to a CDI in-
creases, and the fact that a larger proportion of it is spent working does
not compensate for this. With all the appropriate caveats, Figure 11 can be
read as suggesting that the e®ects of partial reform may indeed have been
perverse, leading to a decrease in welfare among the young, at least in the
1990s.
6 Conclusions
To be written.
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Table 1 (a). Transition probabilities. 20-25 years old. From unem-
ployment
From U to CDD CDI U
(panel) 84 0.05 0.28 0.51
89 0.15 0.27 0.43
91 0.10 0.28 0.38
98 0.18 0.16 0.46
(retrosp) 91 0.11 0.24 0.50
98 0.19 0.14 0.53
As expected? yes yes ?
Table 1 (b). Transition probabilities. 20-25 years old. From a CDD
From CDD to CDD CDI Unemp
(panel) 84 0.16 0.47 0.26
89 0.31 0.42 0.17
91 0.19 0.53 0.14
98 0.38 0.31 0.16
(retrosp) 91 0.45 0.21 0.20
98 0.55 0.16 0.19
As expected? yes yes ?
                                             Figure 1.
          Equilibrium utility of being unemployed and threshold
               productivity,   and the effects of a decrease in c0
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                             Figure 2.
The effects of a decrease in c0 when c-c0 = 0 
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                                            Figure 3
The effects of a decrease in c0 when c-c0 is positive and f(.) is very large
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Figure 8.  CDD,CDI,Students,Unemployed, 20-24
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Figure 10.  Wage discount for CDDs, with controls
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